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Abstract 
This paper serves as an introduction and (incomplete) survey of the wide-ranging literature on job 
loss.  We begin with a discussion of job stability in the US and the commitment between firms and 
workers, and how this has changed in recent years. We then focus on the short and long-term 
consequences to workers (i.e. wages, health outcomes) following a layoff, and the effect which mass 
layoffs have on future firm performance.  The changing nature of these relationships over the past several 
decades is a central theme of this paper.  We review the common data sources used to examine these 
questions, and identify many influential papers on each topic.  Additionally, we discuss alternative 
policies to the typical mass layoff, such as worksharing. 
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Job loss is painful.  There are thousands of individual stories of workers who lose their jobs each 
year from all parts of the world1.  A great deal of work across the social sciences examines the causes and 
consequences of job loss.  This chapter considers a small part of that work and specifically focuses on the 
effects of job loss on workers (including the effects on subsequent wages and on health) and on the effects 
of job loss on companies (including short- and longer-run corporate performance).  It also considers other 
questions such as whether firms are less committed to workers and workers less committed to firms than 
they were in the recent past, considers a variety of data sources for research on job loss, and considers 
alternatives to job loss and various public policies in the United States and throughout the world. 
 To begin, it should be noted that this paper will not focus on other important issues related to job 
loss.  It will not examine, in significant detail, the effects of international trade or tariffs.  The paper is 
also not about labor turnover that is initiated by the worker.  Voluntary quits and separations are not 
discussed, nor are firings for cause or strictly for performance.   
 The paper examines instances where companies layoff employees (temporarily or permanently, 
although the focus is on the later).  It examines changes in the displacement of workers over time, reasons 
for the changes and effects of workers and companies.  There is also a focus on policies to consider 
whether there can be improvements to what is known and done about job loss, and a discussion of how 
other countries handle reductions in the demand for labor. 
 
 
I. Introduction, Data Sources, and Roadmap 
 
 This section of the paper outlines various important data sources for the study of job loss in the 
United States.  It also provides an outline of the rest of the paper. 
                                                 
1
 See Uchitelle (2006) and Uchitelle and Kleinfeld (1996) for examples. 
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Description of Some of the Data on Job Loss 
 
A wide variety of datasets have been used to examine the causes, consequences, and 
characteristics of layoffs.  One of the most popular data sources is the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which is a common source for many labor market 
statistics.  In addition to the survey questions relating to worker displacement in the standard monthly 
CPS, the BLS also makes available a CPS Displaced Worker Supplement, which contains detailed 
questions specifically tailored to worker displacement.  The CPS Displaced Worker Survey began in 1984 
and is conducted every two years.  Examples of clever use the survey include Farber (1999, 2005, and 
2011). 
Another commonly used dataset is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  
Unlike the CPS, the SIPP contains short panels on respondents.  For researchers interested in the health-
related consequences of layoffs, the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) contains among the most 
detailed health questions of any dataset.  Additionally, many of the responses are verified by a doctor to 
avoid self-reporting bias. 
For many questions related to layoffs it is desirable to have long panels (repeated sampling of the 
same individuals over many years).  One of the most commonly used panel datasets, the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), has two cohorts (beginning in 1979 and 1997) which are given 
detailed surveys every other year.  Another popular source, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
currently follows about 9,000 families.  Panel data sources are necessary to answer questions about the 
long-term impact of layoffs, since they allow repeated questions with respect to job loss, job holding and 
income for the same individuals over time.  Additionally, they provide researchers with additional 
statistical modeling choices, such as fixed-effects specifications. 
This paper also discusses some studies conducted using individually collected data.  For example, 
data from Billger and Hallock (2005), Hallock (2009), and Farber and Hallock (2009) include all job loss 
announcements published in the Wall Street Journal for any company ever in the Fortune 500 covering 
the years 1970-2007. 
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Emerging data sources which could provide key insights into the long-term consequences of 
layoffs for both firms and individuals are linked employer-employee data.  In the United States, the 
Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure covers nearly all (98%) private US 
non-farm employment, and allows researchers to follow the employment behavior of workers and firms 
over time.  Some work on mass layoffs has already been conducted using these data (e.g. Abowd, 
Mckinney and Vilhuber 2009). 
 
Definitions of job loss 
One complicating factor in the job loss literature is the degree of subjectivity with which job loss 
can be defined.  From the point of view of the worker, the broadest definition of job loss is any 
involuntary separation from a job.  This rules out voluntary quits, but includes all other job separations.  
Because workers who are fired for cause are often quite different from the rest of the workforce, the 
definition of job loss is typically restricted to layoffs. 
Other important questions are the status (full-time/part-time) and how long the worker held the 
job before being laid off.  For instance, the CPS displaced worker supplement distinguishes between 
workers who are long-tenured (three or more years at the same employer) or short-tenured (less than three 
years). 
The reason for the layoff is also of interest.  Many studies restrict their sample to layoffs which 
result from a plant closure in an attempt to avoid potential selection bias arising from the weakest workers 
being the first laid off.  Although this definition could also suffer from selection bias if the plant closed 
because the average worker quality was lower than at other plants. 
From the perspective of the firm, the definition of a layoff is similarly complicated.  The 
researcher must choose a threshold by which to define a layoff event.  This can be done in absolute terms 
(one-hundred workers laid off) or percentage terms (fifteen percent of a firm's labor force). 
 
 
 
 5
Roadmap for the Paper 
 
 This paper is neither intended to be an exhaustive literature review of all that is known regarding 
job loss nor an exhaustive literature review of the subset of topics that we choose to discuss.  It is 
intended to be a short description of a few areas and discussion of some work related to the effects of job 
loss on workers and on companies over the past several decades.  Section II is an overview of job stability 
in the United States including an examination of changes in job stability over time and a consideration of 
whether it may be the case that firms are less committed to workers and workers are less committed to 
firms than they were in the not-too-distant past.  Reasons for and alternatives to layoffs are discussed in 
Section III.  Work-sharing is extensively examined in Section IV.  Section V begins with an examination 
of the timing of job loss announcements and then goes on to discuss the effects of job loss on workers’ 
subsequent employment and wages and long-term health outcomes.  The results, on average, are not good 
news for workers who lose their jobs.  The effects of job loss on companies are discussed in Section VI.  
This includes an analysis of the link between job loss announcements and CEO pay and CEO turnover 
and the short- and longer-run relationships between job loss and organizational performance.  Concluding 
comments and some additional issues are discussed in Section VII. 
 
 
II. Job Stability in the United States 
 
 Is the average worker in the United States with the same employer for fewer years than in the 
past?  An important first issue is whether job stability has actually changed in the United States.  If it has, 
for whom and why?  This section will briefly examine this literature with significant emphasis on results 
from the Displaced Workers Supplement (DWS) of the Current Population Survey (CPS).   
 
Changes in job stability over time 
 
 Henry Farber has written a series of very important papers (including Farber, 2005, 2007, 2008a, 
2008b and 2011) which clearly and carefully document changes in job stability over time.  Some of this 
work considers whether one can use the Displaced Worker’s Survey to actually identify all relevant job 
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displacement (e.g. Farber, 2008a), some examines general trends in job loss in the United States (Farber, 
2005) and some investigates the change in long-term worker-firm attachment (Farber 2007, 2008b).   
 Farber (2005) examines Displaced Workers Supplements (DWS) from 1984 – 2004 and has 
several important findings.  First, more than 1/3 of job losers are not employed at the next survey date 
(two years later).  Second, about 13 percent of those who lost a full time job are subsequently holding 
part-time jobs.  Third, on average, those who lose full-time jobs earn about 13 percent less on their new 
jobs, relative to the previous one.  Fourth, he estimates that including the foregone earnings increases 
experienced by those who did not lose their jobs, those who lose full time jobs earn on the order of 17 
percent less on their new jobs than they would have, had they not been displaced. 
 As for the interesting question of whether long-term employment has changed in the past 
decades, Farber (2007, 2008b) uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1973 to 2006 by 
birth cohort to examine changes in the length of employment relationships.  He finds that both (a) mean 
tenure and (b) fraction of workers working at least ten or at least twenty years at the same employer have 
each fallen2, particularly among male workers (as a result of growing commitment of women to the labor 
force and the fact that longer-term worker-firm relationships among women has, in fact, increased slightly 
during this period) (See Figures 1a and 1b).   He also finds more of what he calls “churning,” or short-
term jobs, defined as the fraction of workers whose job seniority is less than one year. He concludes that 
younger workers are much less likely than older workers to have a long-term job with the same employer.   
  The growing instability of employment relationships appears to have affected employees at 
various organization levels, and across industries.3  For example, Cappelli (1992) studies managerial 
displacement.  Using the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) he finds that, at least during the 1980s, 
“managers were actually more vulnerable to displacement than were other employees, suffering 
proportionately greater job loss from efforts to streamline and downsize organizations and from plant 
closings.”  (p. 203).  Chan and Stevens (2001) consider job loss among older workers.  Using the Health 
                                                 
2
 Farber (2008a) finds that the drop in average job tenure and in long-term employment is primarily in the private 
sector and that there are some increases in long-term employment in the public sector.   
3
 Also see Brown, Haltiwanger and Lane (2006) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). 
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and Retirement Study (HRS), they find that, for workers who lose jobs after age 55, the employment rate 
is 20 percentage points lower than the employment rate of similar workers who were not displaced.  Elder 
(2004) studies this area with the same data sources and provides structural estimates of a dynamic search 
model.  He finds that “simulations indicate that both market opportunities and age-related preferences for 
leisure are responsible for the observed unemployment durations, but that older workers would still have 
relatively long post-displacement jobless spells if preferences for leisure did not vary with age”. 
 Given Farber’s clear and convincing work, job stability in the United States has clearly changed 
in recent decades.  Long job spells are clearly much less frequent than in the previous generation, 
although there is some variability by gender.  The next section considers reasons for and potential 
alternatives to layoffs. 
 
 
III. Reasons for and Alternatives to Layoffs 
 
 Why do firms execute layoffs?  Are there alternatives to layoffs?  Both of these questions are 
interesting and complicated.  To begin, in this section we describe the reported reasons for job loss in 
more than 5,000 individual layoff events over the past 38 years (Also see Hallock, 2009).  In the sub-
section that follows we discuss a variety of alternatives to layoffs.  There also appears to be diversity in 
the kinds of political pressure, social sanctions and direct economic costs to employers across countries. 
 
 
Changes in Stated (by firms) Reasons for Job Loss 
 
 In the past four decades there has been a quite substantial change in the reported reasons for job 
loss.  Using a sample frame that included all firms that were ever in the Fortune 500 between 1970 and 
2007, data on each job loss announcement described in the Wall Street Journal Index were recorded.  For 
these 5,353 instances, the complete Wall Street Journal article was then read and a variety of information 
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was collected.  This information includes the primary, secondary and tertiary reason for the layoff, the 
number of workers effected and whether white or blue collar workers were included4.   
 Table 1 lists 18 reason categories for the job loss announcements.  The table is arranged, for each 
“reason,” in the following way: the first column shows data for all years, and the subsequent four columns 
relate to specific decades: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000 – 2007.  Clearly the category “demand slump” 
is most frequent, overall and in each decade.  However, there is a substantial amount of variation over 
time.  To see this more clearly, in the Figure 2, the “reasons” are grouped into six general categories: 
“reorganization,” (reorganization, restructuring, and in-house merger), “plant closing,” (leave market and 
plant closing), “slump in demand,” (demand slump, excess supply, and structural), “cost issues,” (cost 
control, posting losses, increase earnings and restore profitability), “other” (increased competition, 
merger, bankruptcy, strike and other), and “missing”.  While these groupings are, in some sense, arbitrary 
and other choices for groupings can easily be made, some dramatic changes over time are clearly visible 
in Figure 2.  Note the scale is the same in each sub-figure, except for “slump in demand”.  The “slump in 
demand” category follows the business cycle quite closely with spikes around the times of the recessions 
in the early 1980s and 1990s and during the end of the high-tech “bubble”.  It is also interesting to note 
that job loss announcements categorized as being due to “reorganization” have changed quite a bit as a 
fraction of all announcements.  Announcements due to “reorganization” became progressively more 
prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s, when some have argued that Wall Street wanted firms to get “lean” 
and encouraged firms to shrink employment (more on this below).  However, the number of 
announcements categorized as “reorganization” dropped quite a bit in the early 2000s. 
 One might wonder about the quality of these “reported reasons” data.  After all, the information 
likely came from a press release, to a reporter and then to a researcher.  In order to consider the quality of 
the “reasons” data culled from newspaper accounts, 40 senior managers were interviewed about how they 
felt about the accuracy of the reasons stated in the Wall Street Journal in relation to the actual reasons for 
                                                 
4
 Billger and Hallock (2005) and Farber and Hallock (2009) use the first thirty years of this 38-year data set.  See 
those papers for more detail on the data construction. 
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job loss.  Many of their responses were interesting.  Some felt that the reasons found in the paper were not 
very related to the actual reason for the announcement5: 
No.  I don’t believe them.  Most of it seems to be management screw-
ups.  Senior Manager, Nondurable Goods Manufacturing 
 
Businesses absolutely manipulate the reasons in the Wall Street Journal.  
But don’t necessarily put a negative connotation on this word.  You do 
everything you can to message. … In the last year, there was almost no 
negative connotation of layoffs.  Firms can make massive layoffs with 
almost no repercussions.  COO, High Tech 
 
Every meeting we go to we talk about a layoff or a downsizing, whatever 
the [expletive deleted] you want to call it … Why does the CEO get any 
satisfaction from using the words we are compressing the size of 
company?  Nobody ever wants to tell the truth.  Senior Manager, Durable 
Goods Manufacturing 
 
Should I have any confidence about what is said?  No.  Audiences are 
different.  The Wall Street Journal is speaking to potential investors so 
the spin is to make opportunities to buy the company stock.  Senior 
Manager, Durable Goods Manufacturing 
 
No.  Rarely.  There is so much corporate speak6. … It is all spun because 
the constituency is the current workforce, shareholders, consumers.  
Senior Manager, Nondurable Goods Manufacturing 
 
They won’t admit poor judgment.  Some truth, but it doesn’t include we 
screwed up.  Senior Manager, Wholesale Trade 
 
 On the other hand, most respondents felt that the articles reported in the Wall Street Journal were 
not false but that some type of “spin” was put on them: 
I never feel that the stated reasons are lies or incorrect.  But I do feel that 
they are never complete … The PR guy’s job is to describe that the glass 
is half full.  Senior Manager, High Tech 
 
I think the companies are trying to collectively manage their image and 
investor confidence.  I think they spin the information.  I always wonder 
what is really happening.  That is the job of the reporter.  I rarely think 
the company is lying.  They just need to put the best light on it.   Senior 
Manager, High Tech 
 
                                                 
5
 These quotes were earlier reported in Hallock (2006). 
6
 O’Neil and Lenn (1995) note that middle managers’ anger over layoffs “was directed at top managements’ 
willingness to accept superficial slogans to justify the harsh reality of layoffs and corporate restructuring.” 
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Firms might take the most glamorous reason … We would have a PR 
agency involved in layoffs and would craft that into what the market 
wanted to hear. …  As with all – layoffs are a scapegoat for poor 
performance.  Weak managers.  Senior Manager, High Tech 
 
Well, I think as positive sounding as we can.  We try to frame it in a 
positive light.  It is a sad story.  We try to emphasize that we are trying to 
do right by the employees.  CFO, High Tech 
 
Probably not accurately.  We spin it a certain way and they take it from 
there. … They accurately portrayed specific pieces.  They spin it to make 
news.  Senior Manager, High Tech 
 
I guess, reasonably confident, that what is in the Wall Street Journal tells 
about 80 percent of the story, possibly… Typically what you see is all 
true.  There just may be additional details.  Senior Manager, Agriculture 
 
Alternatives to Layoffs 
 
 There are several potential alternatives to layoffs.  In this section, I will discuss many of them, 
including wage cuts, “voluntary” time off, paid sabbaticals and work outside the firm, early retirement, 
and voluntary work sharing.  There is a long literature on the tradeoff between job loss and cuts in wages 
(see for example Bewley, 1999, who asks “Why Wages Don’t Fall During A Recession?”).  One option 
for avoiding layoffs is to cut wages.  Rather than cut ten percent of the workforce, a company could cut 
ten percent from the pool of compensation, across-the-board or otherwise.  This may be a viable 
alternative for some organizations but it is difficult to tell at what point this would have to stop.  Some 
companies argue that they would rather have a smaller, fully employed staff than a larger staff that is not 
working full-time and is, therefore, upset about potential lower earnings.  Some organizations have turned 
to temporary help agencies and outsourcing as a way to help buffer the cyclical effects of employment 
demand at their firms (Autor, 2003).  One questions is whether these are “good” jobs. 
Some specific companies have tried to make attempts at alternatives to layoffs, but even these are 
not always sustainable.  An example described in Cascio (2002) is Charles Schwab and Company, who in 
2001 found their commission revenue 57 percent below a year earlier.  The company tried many 
alternatives to layoffs: (1) delaying projects and cutting expenses like travel and entertainment, (2) senior 
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executives taking pay cuts7, (3) encouraging employees to take unused vacations and take unpaid leaves, 
and (4) designating certain Fridays as “voluntary” days off.  In the end, the company did have to make 
layoffs to 2,000 of 25,000 employees but provided generous severance.   
 Cisco Systems is another example described in Cascio (2002).  Cisco understood the value of 
goodwill and the importance of treating employees who were laid off well.  When Cisco cut its workforce 
from 38,000 to 30,500, it tried a program of paying employees one-third of their salaries and “lending” 
them to nonprofits for a year.  This was a way for the company to keep in contact with employees in hope 
of avoiding re-training costs when demand increased.  Cisco made a “Great Places to Work” list during 
this period.   
In a related case, Accenture cut 600 support staff in June 2001 but for some staff the company 
instituted partially paid sabbaticals where the firm paid 20 percent of salary and all benefits and 
employees could keep laptops, an office phone number and e-mail.  Roughly 1,000 workers took this 
option (Cascio, 2002). 
 Many universities this year are offering some staff “early retirement” incentives.  In March 2009, 
Cornell University offered non-faculty staff who are were age 55 or older and worked for the University 
for at least ten years, one year’s salary plus an additional 30 percent of a year pension contribution to 
retire by June.  More than 400 people took the early-retirement option and left the university by June 
2009. 
Some, including Gordon (1996) have argued for “substituting compensatory time as an 
alternative to time-and-a-half for overtime – meaning that workers would be able to work less some other 
day if they worked extra hours today” (p. 247). 
 Oklander (2003) is an interesting case study of a company called Dynabil Industries which, in 
2001 had 130 employees.  After an “all hands meeting” called by the General Manager to discuss 
business performance and projection, all 130 employees filled out a questionnaire that asked them “how 
                                                 
7
 Charness and Levine (2000) find that people rate layoffs as “more fair” if the CEO voluntarily “shared the pain.” 
They also find that people view layoffs due to “reduced demand” more fair than those due to “employee 
suggestions”.  They suggested that “companies should not punish employees for their efforts”.  (p. 381).   
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many days per quarter they could absent themselves from work without pay, and to do so – or not do so – 
completely voluntarily.”  (Oaklander, 2003, p 7).  They were further told their responses were 
nonbinding.  About one-third said they could not sacrifice a day.  In one of the 12 blue collar units, 
everyone volunteered.  The fraction who did not volunteer varied from 16 percent to 75 percent by unit.  
Ten percent of women and 24 percent of men were willing to take more than ten days off.  In all, 81 
workers agreed to participate and a layoff was averted.  It is not at all clear whether this could work 
elsewhere or whether it would work again in the same organization at some other time. 
For some 60 years, Lincoln Electric has maintained a policy of guaranteed continuous 
employment – no permanent U.S. employee has been laid off for “lack of work.” For Lincoln Electric, 
employee layoffs aren’t just a last resort, the option isn’t even put on the table for discussion. Instead, 
merit-based bonus pay, mandatory hours-reductions, and nimble project assignment are all among the 
tools that Lincoln Electric’s leadership draws on when it needs to respond to business cycles turning 
south. (See Koller, 2010)  
 Even companies with long-histories of “no layoff” policies have faced job loss8.  An anecdote 
may show that it is possible to see how quickly companies turn from a strong “no layoff” or “shared 
sacrifice” mentality to one entirely different.  One of us visited a high-tech company with roughly 1,000 
workers in 2001 right after their first job loss.  There were discussions of extraordinary anguish and 
difficulty – including the CEO crying while telling part of his workforce that they would have to go.  He 
visited the headquarters of the same organization about six months later, when they were beginning a new 
round of layoffs.  The senior staff had an entirely different view – and described the situation in stark, 
economic terms.  They said that if the next round of cuts weren’t made, the entire company would go 
under.  The emotion in the job loss seemed to be almost entirely gone. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 See Tuna’s (2008) article in the Wall Street Journal: “No-Layoff Policies Crumble”.  
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IV. Work-Sharing 
 
 Work-sharing is an alternative to layoffs which merits detailed discussion.  It can be thought of as 
the redistribution of labor hours among people with the goal of reducing involuntary unemployment.  As 
an example, consider a firm where all workers earn the same salary.  The firm falls on hard times and 
needs to reduce its payroll by twenty percent.  One way to do this is to layoff twenty percent of its 
workforce.  Under a work-sharing arrangement, however, the firm can instead cut the hours of every 
worker by twenty percent — e.g., by telling workers to stay home on Fridays.  This way, no worker loses 
his or her job, and the firm does not have to incur the costs of the layoff and of hiring and training when 
demand increases. 
 Under this arrangement workers are losing money.  Governments can supplement this lost income 
under programs known as short-time compensation (STC), under which workers receive a prorated 
amount of unemployment insurance benefits to cover the reduction in pay associated with lost hours.  For 
example, Reid (1982) studies an experimental Canadian program put in place in 1977 which resulted in 
layoffs being avoided in twenty-four firms.  Instead of laying off a portion of their workforce, these firms 
reduced the hours of all employees, and the experimental program allowed those workers to receive 
unemployment insurance benefits for the day or so each week which they were not working.  Reid 
concludes that most workers favored the plan because they received, in the typical case, an extra day off 
per week at the cost of a five percent of their after-tax income9, and that employers favored the plan 
because they avoided the costs associated with layoffs. 
 These programs exist in seventeen U.S. states, though they are seldom used.  MacCurdy, Pearce 
and Kihlthau (2004) point out, for example, that less than one percent of California companies with UI 
claims participated in a STC program.  Among the reasons they suggest for the low take-up rate are that 
workers may not want STC since it “imposes reductions in pay that can be avoided by acquiring 
alternative full-time” employment.   Such work-sharing unemployment insurance (WSUI) plans are 
                                                 
9
 Of course, the higher the maintained income, the more expensive the program per participant. 
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relatively much more popular overseas, and can be found in Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and 
Turkey (Hijzen and Venn, 2011). 
 What is one possible explanation for the cross-country variance in the use of work-sharing?  Van 
Audenrode (1994) builds an implicit contract model with unemployment insurance to study the 
relationship between short-time compensation and hours flexibility.  He shows that short-time 
compensation has to be relatively more generous that traditional UI systems in order to get workers to 
accept variable hours.  Studying ten OECD countries, the evidence supports his model.  He finds that in 
countries with the most generous STC programs hours respond quickly to changes in the need for labor.  
He concludes that overall labor adjustments in these countries are as flexible as in the United States 
because hours adjustments compensate for firing restrictions.  He suggests that the failure of STC 
programs in the United States and Canada is caused by the fact that these programs were insufficiently 
generous. 
 In the remainder of this section on work-sharing we will discuss three issues.  The first is a 
general description of work-sharing plans.  The second is the effect of work-sharing on employment.  The 
third is the role of work-sharing in the 2008-2009 recession, with a detailed discussion of the features of 
current work-sharing programs in OECD countries. 
 
Varieties of Work-Sharing 
 
 The goal of work-sharing from a social perspective is that it might be able to reduce the number 
of workers who are involuntarily unemployed.  This goal can be pursued under a number of different 
work-sharing programs.  Dreze, Persson, and Miller (1986) present a work-sharing taxonomy consisting 
of three parts: (1) trading jobs, (2) sharing jobs, and (3) trading hours for jobs.   
Perhaps the most common form of trading jobs is early retirement plans.  The United Kingdom 
introduced such a program in 1976, allowing older workers to leave their jobs early and to receive an 
 15
allowance from the government until the age of normal retirement, provided that their employer replaces 
them with an unemployed worker.  This program was considered to be quite successful.  Belgium offered 
a similar program starting in the late 1970s, but required that the replacement worker be an unemployed 
person under the age of thirty.  France offered a similar program around that time.  Studying these and 
other early retirement programs, Dreze, Persson, and Miller (1986) offer two conclusions.  The first is that 
the mandatory replacement provision is necessary to achieve job creation.  The second is that these 
programs should be popular with older workers, provided that the rate of income replacement is high 
enough. 
 Dreze, Persson, and Miller (1986) examine early retirement on a part-time basis — progressive 
retirement — as a type of job sharing.  In 1982, the United Kingdom introduced a policy where a worker 
could retire early on a half-time basis, with the other half of the worker’s hours being picked up by an 
unemployed person.  In 1983, the French adopted a similar program.  Both programs were extremely 
unsuccessful.  In the U.K., for example, after twelve months of operation the program covered only 578 
jobs.   
By trading hours for jobs, Dreze, Persson, and Miller (1986) mean a statutory decrease in the 
number of hours per week worked by workers, with the goal of increasing the number of employed 
persons.  Belgium and France experimented with such policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s with 
little success.  With the exception of firms operating on a continuous basis with multiple shifts, policies 
which decreased hours per week without mandatory new hiring did not lead to a short-run reduction in 
unemployment.  The authors conclude that early retirement with mandatory replacement is the most 
promising short-run approach to work-sharing. 
 
Effect of Work-Sharing on Employment 
 
 On the surface, it seems that the effect of work-sharing on employment would be unambiguous: 
work spread over more people would result in higher employment.  But is this the case? 
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The Canadian province of Quebec gradually decreased its statutory standard workweek for 
hourly-wage non-union workers from forty-four hours to forty hours over a period of three years starting 
in 1997.  The goal of this policy change was to incentivize firms to hire more workers — prior to the 
policy change, a Quebec firm would have to start paying time-and-a-half at forty-five hours, but after the 
policy change time-and-a-half pay would begin at forty-one hours.  Notably, the policy change did not 
include a requirement that Quebec firms increase the wages of current workers in order to compensate 
them for their lost hours.  Skuterud (2007) studies the effects of this policy change, and finds that it was 
associated with a twenty percent reduction in weekly hours worked beyond forty.  However, the policy 
did not lead to an increase in employment, either at the province or industry level. 
 Given this evidence, where does the intuition break down?  Work-sharing will necessarily 
increase employment if the amount of work that needs to be done is fixed.  But this assumes that the 
amount of work needed to be done is fixed.  Hunt (1998) challenges this assumption.  Suppose that, as 
Skuterud (2007) describes, a policy were enacted which reduced the standard hours per week of work.  If 
this implies an increase in the marginal cost of production at the pre-policy-change level of output, then 
optimal output will fall, and with it the demand for labor.  In addition, this will be reinforced by the 
substitution effect — firms will substitute away from the now-more-costly input, labor, and towards 
capital.  Thus, both hours and employment could actually fall, much less rise, due to work-sharing. 
 There is evidence that something like this happened in Germany.  Beginning in 1985, West 
German unions began to reduce the standard workweek — the maximum number of hours per week 
which do not require overtime pay — in an effort to reduce the number of unemployed workers. Using 
industry-level data and cross-industry variation in standard hours reductions, Hunt (1999) finds that work-
sharing may have reduced employment in the period 1984-1994. 
 The goal of increasing employment is especially important during a recession.  We now turn to 
the effects of work-sharing on employment in such a macroeconomic environment. 
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Work-Sharing and the 2008-2009 Downturn10 
 Hijzen and Venn (2011) study the effect of short-time work schemes on employment and average 
hours of OECD countries during the 2008-2009 recession.  They conclude that work-sharing prevented 
many workers from joining the ranks of the unemployed, particularly in Germany and Japan.     
Twenty-two OECD countries either set up new short-time measures or adjusted existing measures 
in response to the recession.  In Belgium, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and Japan — the OECD countries with 
the highest take-up — between three and six percent of all employees in 2009 participated in a short-time 
program.  Across countries, the goods producing and construction sectors have the highest take-up rates at 
the end of the last decade, while financial, business, social, and personal services have the lowest.  Most 
OECD countries had a work-sharing UI system in place prior to the recession — new programs were 
introduced in Poland, the Netherlands, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Mexico, and 
New Zealand.   
 The main features of these programs are work-sharing requirements, eligibility requirements, 
conditionality requirements, and generosity.  There is inter-country variation across all these dimensions. 
 Work-sharing requirements specify the range of hours reduction required for STC eligibility.  
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States all have a minimum permissible 
reduction in weekly working hours for short-time workers.  The Slovak Republic’s requirement is a mere 
four percent, while Denmark, Ireland, and Norway all require an hours reduction of forty percent.  The 
majority of countries allow a maximum hours reduction of one-hundred percent — i.e., a temporary 
layoff. 
 Eligibility requirements set conditions on firms and workers.  For example, of the twenty-four 
OECD countries studied by Hijzen and Venn (2011), every country except Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand requires that firms provide justification of economic need in order for their 
workers to receive short-time compensation.  Explicit agreements between workers and firms are often 
                                                 
10
 This section is based on Hijzen and Venn (2011). 
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required.  Some countries require that the participating worker be eligible for standard unemployment 
insurance benefits.  Conditionality requirements are relatively less common.  Examples include 
compulsory training for the worker, firm commitments not to fire workers receiving short-time 
compensation, and job-search requirements for the worker. 
 A natural measure of the generosity of a work-sharing UI program is the ratio of the income a 
STC worker receives to his normal income.  There is variance in this measure within countries due to the 
minimum and maximum hours reductions discussed previously.  In France and Korea, a worker can 
receive one-hundred percent of her normal wage under STC.  The lowest ratio is about 0.3, and is found 
in Ireland.  Apart from Ireland and Poland, this ratio is larger than 0.6 for all countries.  Workers in 
eighteen countries can enjoy a ratio of over 0.9, given a certain hours reduction.  
It is interesting to compare within-country the ratio of UI income to normal income under STC 
and the same ratio under a standard UI program.  In almost every country a worker receives more money 
under STC than the standard unemployment benefit.  Portugal is the only country where the standard UI 
benefit exceeds the work-sharing benefit, but even there the UI benefit is only greater when hours have 
been reduced by more than fifty-five percent.    
 An additional component of generosity is the length of time a worker can receive short-time 
compensation.  The median length of time across these countries is twelve months.  Finland has no limit.  
As of 2009, Japan has the second longest duration, at twenty-eight months.  Five countries have a 
maximum duration of two years.  Eight countries have a maximum duration of less than ten months.  The 
responsiveness of the maximum duration to the recession is often striking.  Turkey, for example, more 
than tripled its maximum duration, from less than four months pre-recession to twelve in 2009.  Most 
dramatically, Austria went from a maximum duration of three months to a maximum duration of twenty-
four. 
 To identify the effect of short-time compensation, Hijzen and Venn (2011) employ a differences-
in-differences estimation strategy, using variation in labor-adjustment patterns and in the intensity of use 
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of STC across countries and time.  They conclude that STC had an important impact on job preservation 
during the recession, particularly in Germany and Japan. 
 
 
V. What are the Effects of Job Loss on Workers? 
 
 Given that job loss is so widespread, it is important to understand the effects of job loss on 
individuals and families.  For public policy reasons, it is particularly important to understand the size of 
the effects.  If, post job loss, workers quickly find new jobs, have wages and benefits near the same level 
and have no longer-term negative effects on themselves or their families, then we might think differently 
about job loss than if there were ill effects from job loss.  Uchitelle and Kleinfield (1996) and Uchitelle 
(2006) describe interesting and moving personal stories of those who have lost jobs. The rest of this 
section uses larger data sets (including administrative data) to describe effects on subsequent work and 
wages, and on happiness and health.  The next sub-section begins with a description of the timing of job 
loss. 
 
Timing of Job Loss Announcements 
It is interesting to consider whether firms manipulate the timing of announcements to their 
advantage and whether the timing of announcements has changed over time.  Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of job loss announcements by any firm ever in the Fortune 500 for each of the 38 years from 
1970 – 2007.  The number of job loss announcements tracks the unemployment rate quite closely, except 
for the first two years in the sample and, for some reason, for the five years around the year 2000.   Note, 
that these are announcements, and are not weighted by the number of people in the announcement.  
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the two series track each other so well. 
Given that we know something about the frequency of job loss announcements over time, it is 
interesting to consider whether companies have an incentive to manipulate the timing of 
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announcements11. Yermack (1997) provides evidence that senior managers may manipulate the timing of 
the release of news in their companies for their own benefit.  He argues they do this, in particular, to game 
stock options.  In interviews with a set of 40 senior managers in companies, Hallock (2006) investigated 
whether there might be manipulation of the timing of announcements.  It is surprising that so many 
admitted such manipulation of timing: 
I’ve never been a part of something like that but I would assume there is 
potential to do it.  I imagine you time it just right to drive the stock price.  
I think firms game options. Senior Manager, High Tech 
 
Yes.  There are discussions like that.  Our quarterly earnings release and 
conversation with analysts is day x so the announcement is day x+1.  
Vice President, Agriculture 
 
People see patterns of announcements depending on the timing [of 
options].  Senior Manager, Nondurable Goods Manufacturing 
 
 At the same time, there were other managers who found the idea of manipulating timing 
deplorable: 
No gaming.  [Layoffs] can be absolutely devastating.  One woman was 
lying on my floor screaming and crying.  Senior Manager, Nondurable 
Goods Manufacturing 
 
You make them when you have to make them.  There has to be a catalyst 
event.  It is a human decision.  It is hard.  We cut [a large percentage] of 
employees … It is deplorable to manipulate for short-term financial gain.  
CEO, Mining 
 
 It was interesting to see that some managers felt that they could be flexible in when they made 
layoff announcements.  They mentioned that if the firm was having a terrible year that they could “take a 
bath” and let workers go before the end of the fiscal year.  This was so they could begin the new year with 
a “clean slate”. 
Our fiscal year starts on [X] of each year.  We may make sure that all 
employees are out for the end of the fiscal year so we can have everyone 
out and lower costs for the next year.  Senior Manager, Durable Goods 
Manufacturing 
                                                 
11
 The discussion here follows Hallock (2006) closely.  The quotes from managers, below, are directly from that 
source.   
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Fiscal year?  I don’t know.  This business of taking a one-time charge.  
In [X] or the first weeks of [Y].  You report 2000 results plus exceptional 
one-time charge for severance and then you go into next year clean.  
Vice President, Durable Goods Manufacturing 
 
 A few managers noted that they did not want to let workers go near “the holidays”.   
No one wants to do it at Thanksgiving or Christmas.  Senior Manager, 
High Tech 
 
There is always a year-end crisis … So take the charge at the end of the 
year to make next year get better.  Is that appropriate to be laying people 
off around the holidays?  Senior Manager, Nondurable Goods 
Manufacturing 
 
We didn’t want to have layoffs in December for emotional reasons, not 
financial … We don’t want to lay people off at Christmas.  That just 
[expletive deleted].  Senior Manager, High Tech 
 
This leads one to consider whether the timing of announcements during the year varies over time.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of when the announcements occurred during the year, by decade.  The 
period from 1970 -1979 and the period from 2000 – 2007 are quite different in this regard.  Notice that 
the figure for the 1970s has an “inverted U” shaped.  That is, there is a spike in announcements early in 
the year and another run up in the final weeks of the year.  The period from 2000 – 2007, on the other 
had, appears “flatter”.  That is, announcements seem to be timed more evenly throughout the year.  This is 
consistent with the idea that layoff announcements are potentially more routine now than they were in the 
past.  Figure 5 shows the distribution of the day of the week the layoff announcements appeared in the 
Wall Street Journal, by decade.  The period from 2000 – 2007 is strikingly different from the other 
periods in that the announcements are as likely to appear on any day of the week.  This is in striking 
contrast to previous decades. 
 
Effects on Subsequent Work and Wages  
 
 Important considerations when workers lose jobs are how quickly they find new ones and do the 
new jobs have similar compensation and benefits.  A large body of literature documents large and long-
lasting negative effects of job loss on workers’ subsequent employment and earnings.  
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In the seminal paper on the issue of earnings losses after displacement, Jacobson, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993) use administrative data from Pennsylvania during 1974 - 1986 on workers’ earnings 
histories with details about their companies to consider the magnitude and the time pattern of wages for 
displaced workers.  The administrative data are a very large sample which allows the authors to apply 
techniques from the program evaluation literature.  The authors find that high-tenured workers leaving 
“distressed” firms suffer long-term losses on the order of 25 percent of their wages.  Interestingly they 
also find that, on average, wage losses begin before workers lose their jobs, depend on local labor market 
conditions and industries and are significant even in cases where workers find jobs in similar companies. 
 In a follow-up to Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), Couch and Placzek (2008) perform a 
very similar analysis for a different state (Connecticut) and for a more recent time period.  While their 
results are somewhat similar, there are some interesting differences.  While Jacobsen, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993) find long-term (six years post displacement) effects of 25 percent lower earnings, Counch 
and Placzek (2008) estimate effects of 13 percent to 15 percent.  Couch and Placzek (2008) find 
immediate effects of about 33 percent and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) estimate immediate 
effects on the order of 40 percent.  Counch and Placzek (2008) argue that the larger effects estimated in 
Pennsylvania are due to the fact that there was a very high fraction of Unemployment Insurance recipients 
in Pennsylvania during the time of that study12.   
 A host of other papers estimate earnings losses following displacement using a variety of sources 
including the Displaced Workers Supplement (e.g. Topel, 1990, Farber, 1997, Carrington, 1993 and Neal, 
1995), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (e.g. Ruhm, 1991 and Stevens, 1997), the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) (e.g. Couch, 1998 and Chan and Stevens, 2004), and the National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLSY) (e.g. Farlie and Kletzer, 2003).  In general, these studies find smaller negative effects on 
wages post-displacement than administrative studies.  Given the potential biases from survey data, this is 
an interesting finding.  Von Wachter, Handwerker and Hildreth (2009) try to reconcile differences 
                                                 
12
 Eliason and Storrie (1996) study long-term effects of displacement in Sweden using linked employer-employee 
data.  They find that workers in Sweden also suffer long term losses in the short and long (4 years) run. 
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between the administrative and survey results using a unique match of the Displaced Worker Supplement 
(DWS)13 and administrative records in California.  When they use a common method to account for 
measurement error in survey wages that are correlated with demographics of workers, they find earnings 
estimates are similar across the two data sources.  
 Some authors have taken a different approach to considering effects of job loss on wages.  Two 
examples are Stevens (1997) and Hanner (2005).  Using the PSID, Stevens finds that much of the 
persistence in the effects of negative earnings losses post-displacement are due to additional job losses in 
the years following the initial displacement.  Hanner (2005), examines the effects of job loss on the 
distribution of earnings using, among other methods, quantile regression.  He finds that, in his sample, 
while mean earnings fall by 22 percent, the 5th percentile of income falls 45 percent and a significant 
number of workers experience gains following displacement. 
 In a more recent paper, Von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2007) investigate very long effects 
of displacement during the early 1980s recession on earnings using administrative data from 1974 through 
2004.  They find that workers who permanently leave an employer between 1980 and 1995, for which 
they worked a long time, have very large and continuing earnings losses as many as 20 years later.  They 
attribute the losses to reductions in employment and in pay for those who continue to work. 
 
Effects on Happiness and Health 
 
 Independent of the issue of earnings losses following displacement is the important issue of the 
effects of job loss on health and happiness of those who are displaced form work.  There is a rich 
literature in applied psychology on the effects of job loss on the “survivors” of layoffs14 that we will not 
cover in this paper.  More recent work by economists (and others) is focusing on the effects of job loss on 
health, both physical and emotional, for displaced workers. 
                                                 
13
 Also see Kletzer (1989) for an interesting investigation of the role of previous job tenure on earnings after job 
loss. 
14
 See, for example, Brockner (1992), Brockner, Greenberg, Brockner, Bortz, Davy and Carter (1986), Brockner, 
Grover, Reed, DeWitt and O’Malley (1987), Brockner, Konovsky, Cooper-Schneider, Folger, Martin and Bies 
(1994) , Illes (1996), and Mishra and Spreitzer (1998).   Muirhead (2002) makes the business case for educational 
training for displaced workers. 
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 Much of the work in the area finds the overall health of displaced workers may be substantially 
comporomised as a result of job loss.  Two papers have alternative findings to this.  With a provocative 
title, Ruhm (2000) asks “Are Recessions Good for Your Health?”.  He concludes the paper by stating, 
among other things, “Surprisingly the answer appears to be yes.” (p. 647).  Primarily relying on fixed-
effect models with U.S. states as the unit of observation, Ruhm (2000) finds that total mortality and eight 
of his ten sources of mortality move with the business cycle15.  Another study finds no negative effects on 
stress following job-loss.  Browning, Dano and Heinesen (2006) study men in Denmark from 1981 – 
1999 and find no evidence that being displaced from a job is related to being hospitalized for a stress 
related disease. 
 Given the potential problems with using state-level data to consider these sorts of questions, 
Sullivan and Von Wachter (2007, 2009) consider similar issues and study the relationship between job 
loss, career outcomes and mortality for individuals using administrative data.    
They match quarterly earnings and employment records to death certificates and find that job 
displacement leads to a 15 percent to 20 percent increase in death rates during the subsequent 20 years.  
They calculate that if this rate continued beyond the estimation period that this would translate into a loss 
in life expectancy for someone at age 40 of 1.5 years!  They go on to suggest that “factors correlated with 
a decrease in mean earnings and a rise in the standard deviation of earnings have the potential to explain 
an important fraction of the effect of displacement on mortality.” (Sullivan and von Wachter, 2007, p. 1.)  
Additonally, Catalano and Wilson (1994) use individual panel data and find an increase in depression 
following job loss. 
 The effects on workers, from loss of earnings, to potentially serious health outcomes are 
substantial.  If outcomes for workers are negative, and there is significant evidence that they are, it is 
important to consider the potential effects on companies.  This is the subject of the next section. 
 
                                                 
15
 Also see Martikainen, Maki and Jantti (2007) who study the relationship between unemployment and mortality for 
Finnish men.  They find “no excess mortality … among those who, at baseline, were employed at workplaces that 
had experienced reductions in employment.” (p. 1070). 
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VI. What are the Effects of Job Loss on Firms? 
 
 Many authors carefully document trends in worker attachment and job loss (e.g. Farber 2008), the 
personal stories of displaced workers (e.g. Uchitelle, 2006) or the effects of job loss on workers 
subsequent outcomes including earnings (e.g. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993) and health (e.g. 
Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009).  While these studies are critically important to understanding the 
effects of job loss on workers, a distinct literature has been building more recently that aims to consider 
the effects of job loss on firms.  In the first instance, it would seem reasonable that firms let workers go 
because it is in the best interest of the firm (or the firm, obviously, would not have done it)16.  However, 
what would we think if, upon further investigation, we found that job loss is bad for workers and their 
families and it is bad for firms?  This section aims to investigate the effects of job loss on companies.  The 
effects include the outcomes for CEOs, for short-run stock prices, for company stock prices and viability 
in the longer run, and for productivity.  Most of the analysis is necessarily confined to publicly traded 
companies in the United States.   
 
The Effect of Mass Layoffs on CEO pay 
 
 There is a massive literature on executive compensation in the United States that may have been 
driven, in part, by access to data.  Much of this work is focused on the extremely important goal of 
determining the link between the pay of the company CEO and the performance of the firm (e.g. Murphy, 
1985).  The aim of this section is to consider another potential correlate of CEO pay – job loss.  Starting 
in the middle of the 1990s, the popular press (Sloan, 1996) and some policy groups  (Anderson and 
Cavanagh, 1994) became very interested in the relationship between job loss in companies and executive 
                                                 
16
 Note, however, that some have argued for a broader view of goals of corporations.  Blair and Gomoroy (2008) 
recently wrote “In the rush to globalization, the United States has tossed aside a crucial principle that guided the 
economic prosperity of the twentieth century: corporate leaders have a responsibility to their country, their 
community, and their employees that goes beyond maximizing share value.” 
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compensation – do executives profit at the same time (or in the wake of) their employees losing their 
jobs? 
 Hallock (1998) investigates the relationship between the compensation of CEOs of companies 
and whether those companies lay off workers.  The paper uses data form three main sources.  First, is the 
CEO compensation data collected from Forbes Magazines annual CEO compensation issues17.  Three 
measures of compensation examined in the paper are salary plus bonus, salary plus bonus plus other 
(including such measures as savings plan contributions and the value of memberships to clubs) and total 
compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, other and also the value of stock options exercised).  The second  
data on company characteristics is obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat and from The University 
of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  Finally, information on layoffs is from Pro 
Quest’s Newspaper Abstracts.  Abstracts from the Wall Street Journal were searched for the words 
“layoff,” “laid off,” “downsize,” “plant closing,” or “downsizing”.  3,470 abstracts were found from 1987 
through 1995.   
 In order to determine whether there is a simple relationship between layoff announcements and 
CEO pay, Hallock (1998) plots the number of layoff announcements in the Wall Street Journal and 
median CEO total compensation against time and finds that both grow over the sample period.  Since, as 
pointed out by Rosen (1992) and others, CEO pay is very strongly related to company size, Hallock 
(1998) also plots the fraction of companies announcing at least one layoff and the real median CEO total 
compensation against the size of the company, as measured by market value of equity (Figure 6).  The 
smallest ten percent of companies are in market value of equity decile 1, the next 10 percent of companies 
are in decile 2 all the way up to the largest 10 percent of companies in decile 10.  It is clear from the 
figure that larger companies pay more and are more likely to announce a layoff in a given year. 
 A more formal analysis of layoffs and CEO compensation reveals that the apparent relationship 
may be nothing more than a mere statistical association.  Table 2 shows the results of regressing the log of 
                                                 
17
 The reporting on CEO compensation is more detailed now than it was when this paper was published.  There were 
major changes in how executive compensation is reported in 1992 and again in 2006. 
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CEO total compensation18 on whether the company had a layoff in the previous year.  The results of this 
regression appear in column (1) of Table 2.  The coefficient on lagged layoff is 0.378 (translating into a 
percentage gain of roughly 46 percent), and it is highly statistically significant.  This is a large effect, and 
taken at face value suggests that the pay premium to CEOs for making large layoffs is quite high.  
However, taking into account the importance of firm size (as evidenced by Figure 6) and other firm-
specific characteristics, column (2) repeats the specification of column (1) with additional controls: 
lagged log market value of equity, lagged one year stock return, age of the CEO and its square, seniority 
of the CEO and its square, and yearly indicator variables.  The coefficient on lagged layoff declines 
substantially to 0.134 but is still statistically significantly different from zero.  Finally, in a specification 
controlling for individual firm effects (column 3), the coefficient on lagged layoff is negative and not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  So, once firm-specific effects are controlled for, the CEO 
pay premium for laying off workers disappears.  Note, however, that many CEOs hold many times their 
annual income in stock and stock options in their firms (Hallock and Torok, 2008).  Therefore, in order to 
continue this investigation, it is sensible to consider the relationship between job loss announcements and 
stock prices. 
 
Mass layoffs and Profitability or Value in the Very Short Run 
 
 There are many reports in the popular press of large layoffs at firms in the U.S. and around the 
world.  There is also a great deal of discussion about the potential effects of these layoffs on companies 
executing layoffs.  Some argue that the layoffs are necessary to maintain the financial health of the 
company.  A host of studies linking job loss announcements to short-term stock prices have been written 
in the past few decades19.  Following on early work (Farber and Hallock, 2009) that used data on the stock 
price reaction to layoffs announcements for any firm ever in the Fortune 500 from 1970 – 1999, here we 
report information on the stock price reaction to layoff announcements for any firm ever in the Fortune 
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 The results do not differ significantly if another form of compensation is considered instead. 
19
 See, for example, Farber and Hallock (2009), Abowd, Milkovich and Hannon (1990), Blackwell, Marr and Spivey 
(1990), Caves and Kreps (1993), Gombola and Testsekos (1992), Gunderson, Verma and Verma (1997), Hallock 
(1998), Kalra, Henderson and Walker (1994) and Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995). 
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500 any year during the 38 year period from 1970 – 2007.  (Refer back to Figure 3 for the distribution of 
the number of these announcements each year during the period. 
 The sample frame for this paper is every company that was ever in the Fortune 500 from 1970 
through the end of 2007.  For example, if a firm only joined the Fortune 500 in 1985, data were collected 
not only for 1985 but for every year in which the company was publicly traded.  The Wall Street Journal 
Index was read for each company to locate any record of a job loss of any kind in any of these companies.  
After that, the complete article for each layoff event was then read20.  This yields a sample of 5,353 
unique job loss announcements made by Fortune 500 firms during the 28 years from 1970 – 2007. (Refer 
back to Figure 3 for the distribution of the number of these announcements each year during the period). 
 In order to calculate the short-term stock price reaction to layoff announcements a simple event 
study method is used (see, for example, MacKinlay, 1997).  We assume that the market became aware of 
the job loss announcement very near to the time of the printing in the Wall Street Journal. 
 We calculate cumulative average excess returns using value-weighted return data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Let t index time in trading days and 
let i index the companies.  In the first-stage Rit, the daily stock return for the company, is regressed on 
Rmt, the value-weighted return for the market.  This regression is run for some period in the past21:  
itmtiiit RR η+β+α= . 
Next, for days around the event, the daily abnormal (or excess) returns can be calculated as follows: 
)Rˆˆ(RER mtiiitit β+α−= , 
 where iαˆ  and iˆβ are estimated in the earlier equation.  One can think of the excess return, ER, as the part 
of the movement in the stock return of company i that is not correlated with overall market movement in 
stock returns and presumably reflects unexpected firm-specific factors. 
                                                 
20
 See Farber and Hallock (2009) page 2 for more details on how the data were constructed for the earlier period.  
The same structure was used to collect the data reported on here. 
21
 The period from 60 days before to 30 days before the event is used.  Various changes to this interval have no 
noticeable affect on the results. 
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 Excess returns can be calculated for many days around the “event window”.  In this paper, all 
calculations are based on a 3-day window (the day before, the day of, and the day after the event)22.  
Figure 7 displays the average cumulative excess returns over a three-day window for each of the 38 years 
from 1970 – 2007.  It is clear from the figure that the share price reaction to job loss announcements was 
negative in the 1970s and seems to have flattened out by the middle to end of this decade. 
 One might ask whether the stock price reactions reported in Figure 7 may have been influenced 
by “other” news in the companies.  For example, perhaps earnings were announced on the same day as 
the layoff.  In order to isolate the effect of layoff announcements, the second line in Figure 7 repeats the 
analysis after removing any announcement that is within 30 days of another layoff, earnings 
announcement, stock split announcement or dividend announcement for the same company.  It is clear 
from the figure that this does not markedly alter the main findings.   
 In addition to considering the average effect of job loss announcements on stock prices, one 
might also want to consider the distributional consequences on stock prices.  Figure 8 is an attempt to 
investigate this issue.  This figure reports the distribution of the returns by decade for the years 1970-
1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2007.  The figure shows a wide diversity in the returns by decade, 
with no marked differences in the spread of the distribution over time23. 
 Regression analysis shows that the stock price reaction to job loss announcements has, indeed, 
changed over time (Table 3).  The table reports the results from regressions of the three-day cumulative 
excess returns on indicators for decade (the excluded decade is 1970 – 1979) and “reasons” for the layoffs 
(the reasons reported earlier are condensed into five categories: reorganization, plant closing, demand 
slump, cost and other (the excluded category is “missing reason”).  From column (1) , one can see that the 
excess returns in the 1970s (the constant term since the 1970s are the excluded category) were -0.654 
percent.  The returns in the 1980s were higher (less negative), the returns from the 1990s still higher and 
                                                 
22
 Changes to this window length have no material affect on the results. 
23
 One might think that one reason for the shift toward zero in the stock price returns to job loss over time are due t 
the fact that news is no longer “newsworthy”.  Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006) investigate the share price reaction 
to a variety of corporate news announcements.  They do not find evidence that is consistent with the “news is no 
longer newsworthy” hypotheses.  
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the returns in the 2000s not statistically significant from those in the 1970s.  Furthermore, changes in the 
mix of reasons for job loss announcements over time are not the explanation for the change in the returns 
to job loss announcement over time (column 2).  The final columns of Table 3 report the results for each 
decade separately.  Of note is the fact that the stock price reaction to job loss announcements for the 
“reorganization,” “cost”, and “other” reasons are strongly positively significant. Farber and Hallock 
(2009) explore many other reasons for the change in the stock price reaction to job loss announcements 
for an earlier period (that does not include data after 1999) and find that reasons, industry changes, type of 
worker (e.g. salaried versus not) do not explain the kinds of changes seen in Figure 7. 
 
Mass Layoffs, Productivity, Profitability and Value in the Longer Run 
 
 Perhaps more important than considering the effects of job loss on the short-term stock price 
reaction of firms is to consider the long-term effects of lob loss on company viability and profitability24.  
The problem, of course, is that this is a much more difficult question to answer25.  We can imagine that 
firms would not reduce headcount if it were not in the best interests of the company.  However, increasing 
the time period over which we can study the “long-term” effects, also increases the probability that some 
confounding effects will be introduced into the analysis. 
 A classic example of a study of the longer-term effects of downsizing on corporate value is Dial 
and Murphy (1995).  The authors describe an extraordinary change at General Dynamics that began in 
1991.  The company hired a new management team and committed to a strategy of creating shareholder 
value in the face of a potentially serious fall for demand for defense-related products.  They also 
specifically tied compensation of senior managers to the creation of shareholder wealth26.  The senior 
                                                 
24
 One possibility would be to do a longer-run event study of job loss announcements on abnormal returns such as 
how Desai and Jain’s (1999) analysis of spinoffs. 
25
 Brown, Haltiwanger and Lane (2006) discuss churning, workforce quality and firm productivity from a more 
macro perspective. 
26
 The authors note that “Laying off employees and leaving communities is personally painful for managers 
(particularly those with long company tenures).  It is relatively easy to provide incentives for growth: Managers 
intrinsically enjoy opening new plants, hiring new workers, and announcing new investment programs.  In contrast, 
few managers enjoy downsizing: it’s simply less fun than growing.” (p. 266). 
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managers began a strategy of extraordinary downsizing and restructuring which lead to sizeable 
compensation to the managers.  Total employment at General Dynamics when the new CEO, William 
Anders, was hired in 1991 was 98,150.  Total employment at General Dynamics at the end of 1993 was 
26,800.  During that same time period, executives at General Dynamics were rewarded and shareholders 
had gained a return of 553%.  Clearly there was more going on at General Dynamics than simply a new 
compensation package for managers and layoffs.  Nevertheless, this is an extremely interesting case 
study.  The CEO, Anders, had the following to say regarding whether resources from shareholders should 
have been used to help retrain workers who lost their jobs: “I do not see that we have a special obligation 
to our employees. This is an issue of excess human capacity that had to leave the defense industry. We 
trained our people to have specific skills and paid for that training. Then we paid them for their skills”. 
(Dial and Murphy, 1995, p. 303).   
Firms presumably downsize because they believe that downsizing will lead to better performance.  
An important measure of performance is productivity.  If laid-off workers contributed relatively little to 
productivity, then we would expect productivity to rise after a layoff.  It is reasonable to think that this is 
also the expectation of firms which choose to downsize.  Is this happening? 
Using plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), Baily, Bartlesman, and 
Haltiwanger (1994) study productivity growth in the U.S. manufacturing sector during the 1980s, a period 
marked by extensive downsizing.  They find, “in contrast to the conventional wisdom,” “that plants that 
increased employment as well as productivity contribute almost as much to overall productivity growth in 
the 1980s as the plants that increased productivity at the expense of employment” (emphasis added).   
Using the same methodology as Baily, Bartlesman, and Haltiwanger (1994) applied to the U.K. Annual 
Census of Production (ACOP) to study the U.K.’s motor vehicle manufacturing sector, Collins and Harris 
(1999) find that “successful” downsizers — firms which decreased employment and increased 
productivity — had higher productivity growth, but that firms which were “unsuccessful” downsizers — 
firms which decreased employment and productivity — had very low relative productivity growth.  
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 An alternative way to investigate the relationship between downsizing and productivity is to 
study the effects of employment protection.  If firms want to downsize but are unable to do so due to legal 
and regulatory constraints, then we might expect firm performance to be hurt as consequence of the 
presence and enaction of employment protection.  
 Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007) use variation in the cost of dismissing employees brought on by 
the adoption of wrongful discharge protection by U.S. state courts from the late 1970s through the early 
1990s to study the relationship between employment protection and productivity.  Using establishment-
level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, they find that wrongful discharge protection led to a reduction in 
employment flows and that the short-run rise in adjustment costs led to a decrease in total factor 
productivity.   Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2009) confirm this basic finding by studying the impact of 
job protection legislation on industry-specific productivity growth, employing a differences-in-differences 
strategy using panel data from eleven OECD countries.  They find that layoff restrictions reduce 
productivity growth in industries where such restrictions are more likely to be binding. 
 A possible channel through which employment protection could decrease productivity is through 
the effort of “survivors” — those employees who remained employed by the firm after the firm 
downsized.  Ichino and Riphahn (2005) study the effect of employment protection on a particular form of 
worker effort: worker absenteeism.  They use weekly observations for male and female workers hired for 
white-collar jobs by a large Italian bank in the mid-1990s.  For the first twelve weeks of employment, 
these workers are on probation; after twelve weeks the workers enjoy employment protection.  The 
average numbers of days absent from work per week more than triples for men and shows a sizable 
increase for women after employment protection kicks in. 
 Joel Brockner and coauthors have extensively studied the effects of downsizing on survivors’ 
effort, with mixed finding.  Studying the effect of layoffs on survivors using a laboratory experiment, 
Brockner et al (1986) find evidence in support of “positive inequity theory” — the idea that by surviving 
a layoff, a worker will perceive her “outcome-to-input ratio” to be larger than her laid-off coworkers, will 
experience guilt, and will consequently increase her work effort.  Likewise, Brockner et al (1993), using 
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evidence from both the lab and the field, find that the work effort of survivors is increasing in the 
perceived threat of a future layoff. 
Brockner et al (1992) argues that the change in work effort of survivors brought on by a layoff is 
driven by perceptions about job insecurity.  Using survey data of employees of a national retail chain, 
they find that the pre- to post-layoff change in reported work effort follows an inverted U pattern over job 
insecurity — if survivors feel either very secure or very insecure about their employment probability then 
the change in work effort is relatively low, whereas if survivors feel moderately secure then the change in 
work effort is relatively large.  They hypothesize that survivors who feel very secure may be complacent, 
that survivors who feel very insecure may feel helpless, and that workers who feel moderately secure may 
feel empowered to affect their outcome. 
An interesting example of studying the longer-term effects of job loss is Cappelli (2000) who 
examines downsizings.  He specifically defines “downsizing as reductions in jobs driven by the desire to 
improve operating efficiencies” and distinguishes that from “layoffs typically associated with shortfalls in 
demand.”  Cappelli uses data from the National Center on the Educational Quality of the Workforce 
(EQW) of the United States Census Bureau, which is an establishment-level survey of employment 
practices.  He considers the relationship between downsizing and several outcomes including sales per 
worker, labor costs per worker, or labor costs as a percentage of total costs.  The results do not all point to 
the same conclusion and the issues are, obviously, difficult.  Unfortunately, the study did not include a 
measure of accounting profit or organization value, in the data.  Nevertheless, one of Cappelli’s 
interesting conclusions is that “At least in the mid-1990s, when these data were collected, job reduction 
decisions seem not to have been dominated by factors associated with shortfalls in demand.  Whether this 
situation represents something distinct about that period – one of economic expansion when the level of 
excess capacity in establishments may have been too small to drive job cuts – or something more 
fundamental is a question for further research”.  (p. 511). 
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One study that specifically measures the relationship between employment change and firm 
performance in the longer-run is Cascio, Young and Morris (1997)27.  The authors use 5,479 instances of 
changes in employment and investigate the relationship between these employment changes and return on 
assets (their measure of profitability) and return on common stock.  However, as opposed to much of the 
current discussion, this study examines the total employment change in a firm that is not limited to layoffs 
(i.e. some of the job loss could be voluntary on the part of the worker and, in addition, if one worker 
leaves and another takes her place this would be undetected).  With these limitations in mind, the authors 
find that companies that just lowered employment performed no better than other companies.  On the 
other hand, companies that downsized and “restructured assets28” had both higher returns on assets and 
returns on stock than their industry competitors.   
The data on employment change in Cascio, Young and Morris (1997) are from Standard & Poor’s 
CompuStat.  Our understanding is that the employment data in CompuStat are missing for a reasonably 
large fraction of the observations.  Further the employment data are not audited (like accounting data)29 so 
these results should be regarded with some caution. 
 
The Relationship between Mass Layoffs and CEO Turnover 
 
 Another firm outcome that can be studied with respect to job loss is CEO turnover30.  Are job loss 
announcements and CEO turnover in large companies positively or negatively related?  Which comes 
first?  Are some CEOs hired to lay people off?  Billger and Hallock (2005) examine some of these issues 
using data over a 31-year period on job loss announcements and CEO turnover.  They find that CEO 
turnover is significantly related to one or more job loss announcements the previous year.  This 
relationship has also changed over the decades (with a stronger effect in 1970s than in later decades).  
                                                 
27
 Wayhan and Werner (2000) study the long-term impacts of job loss for a sample of companies who reduced 
employment in 1991 or 1992.  They find that workforce reductions improve financial performance, and that the 
effect is stronger in the short-run. 
28
 They define “asset downsizers” as companies where the decline in employment was more than 5 percent and the 
decline in plant and equipment exceeded the change in employment by more than 5 percent. 
29
 See Hallock (1998) for more detail. 
30
 Of course, CEO turnover can be voluntary.  In much of the literature on CEOs, however, turnover is thought to be 
a negative outcome.  
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They consider different types of layoff announcements separately.  Layoffs that are associated with 
negative stock price reactions (i.e. the market thought they were a “bad” idea) are more likely to lead to 
CEO turnover than those associated with positive stock price reactions (i.e. the market thought they were 
a “good” idea), especially earlier in the sample. 
 
VII. Concluding Comments  
 
 Job loss is extremely difficult for individuals, families and organizations.  This paper provides an 
overview of just some of the issues related to job loss including changes in stability of jobs over time in 
the United States, the issues of timing of job loss, reasons for job loss and alternatives, work-sharing and 
short-time compensation programs, the relationship between job loss and subsequent wages and health of 
workers, and the effects of job loss on companies.  Our own opinion is that things have changed quite a 
bit in this area in recent years.  Cappelli (2005) notes “For employees, economic downturns are now more 
catastrophic, because more workers are laid off more quickly with less chance of being rehired, while 
those who remain employed find their employment conditions worsening.  But upturns are now more 
advantageous, as employers bid not only for entry-level help, as they have in the past, but also for 
experienced workers.” (p. 110). 
There are several findings about job loss and its effects on firms and workers in this paper.  First, 
it is clear that there has been a marked change in stability of jobs in the United States.  A decline in job 
stability alone does not necessarily mean bad news for workers.  In fact, increased job change could be 
good for workers.  However, additional evidence suggests that on average, this is not the case.  Second, 
there appears to have been a shift in the types of layoffs that have occurred in the past forty years in the 
United States.  For example, job loss specifically due to “deficient demand” seems to be less prevalent 
than in the past.  Third, a host of evidence shows a significant and negative impact of job loss on workers, 
both in terms of employment and earnings, and in terms of health and happiness.  Fourth, the very short-
term stock price reaction to job loss announcements has changed markedly over time and is now quite 
modest.  The longer-term impacts of job loss on company performance are less clear and more work 
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needs to be done in this area.  But if companies are not markedly improved by shedding workers, why 
does it happen?  Fifth, a look overseas reveals that many countries handle job loss in a very different way 
than the United States.   
Finally, there have been many public policy proposals in and suggestions for improving the 
economy and dampening the effects of job loss.  Evidence suggests that much more work needs to be 
done in this area and to form a scientific base for designing effective evidence-based policy.  
Nevertheless, it is clear from the sub-set of the papers in the literature studied here that the nature of the 
worker-firm relationship has changed quite a bit in the last few generations – a change that has negatively 
impacted the lives of workers and produced modest, if any, benefits for firms.   
Will things ever be the way they used to be?  Will the next recession be different?  Are things 
different now than they were just a few years ago — did the so-called Great Recession further change the 
relationship between firms and workers?  Has the employment contract, in fact, changed in the past few 
generations?  It seems that the balance of evidence suggests that the answer to this last question is yes. 
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Figure 1a. Mean Job Tenure by Age and Year Cohort: Men 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1b. Mean Job Tenure by Age and Year Cohort: Women  
 
 
 
Source: Henry Farber using Displaced Workers Supplements
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Figure 2. Distribution of Stated Reasons for Announced Job Loss Over Time 
 
 
 
Categories are consolidated from the categories listed in Table 1.  Categories are “Reorganization” 
(Reorganization, Restructuring and In-House Merger), “Plant Closing” (Leave Market and Plant Closing), 
“Slump in Demand” (Demand Slump, Excess Supply, Structural), “Cost Issues” (Cost Control, Posting 
Losses, Increase Earnings and Restore Profitability), “Other” (Increased Competition, Merger, 
Bankruptcy, Strike and Other), and “Missing”.
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Figure 3. Number of Layoff Announcements and Unemployment Rate, by Year 
 
  
 
Source: Calculations by the authors using announcement information from the Wall Street Journal.
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Figure 4. Frequency of Announced Layoffs by Week in the Year 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations by the authors using announcement information from the Wall Street Journal.
20
40
60
80
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 
An
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
ts
0 10 20 30 40 50
Week During the Year
1970-1979
10
20
30
40
50
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 
An
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
ts
0 10 20 30 40 50
Week During the Year
1980-1989
10
20
30
40
50
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 
An
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
ts
0 10 20 30 40 50
Week During the Year
1990-1999
0
10
20
30
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 
An
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
ts
0 10 20 30 40 50
Week During the Year
2000-2007
 49
Figure 5. Frequency of Job Loss Announcements by Day of Week they Appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations by the authors using announcement information from the Wall Street Journal.
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Figure 6. Fraction of Firms Announcing at Least One Layoff and Median Total Compensation by Market 
Value of Equity Decile 
 
 
 
Source: Hallock (1998). 
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Figure 7. Cumulative Average Excess Returns (One Day Before to One Day After the Layoff) 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations by the authors using announcement information from the Wall Street Journal and 
data stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
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Figure 8. Distribution of Cumulative Excess Returns by Decade 
 
  
 
Source: Calculations by the authors using announcement information from the Wall Street Journal and 
data stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
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Table 1. Data Sources on Job Loss 
Source Sample Size  Panel Details 
Current 
Population 
Survey 
~60,000 households Short (1 year) Monthly survey (March is the most 
commonly used month because it asks 
respondents about income).  The standard 
source of US labor market data (e.g. 
unemployment rate).  
Displaced 
Worker Survey 
~60,000 households 
(All CPS households 
are given the survey) 
Short (1 year) A supplement to the CPS given every two 
years.  Displacement is defined as follows 
(via CPS website): “Persons 20 years of 
age and older who lost or left jobs because  
their plant or company closed or moved, 
there was insufficient work for them to do, 
or their position or shift was abolished” 
 
Health and 
Retirement 
Survey 
~22,000 individuals None Main focus is on health outcomes for 
persons age 50 and over.  Health status 
verified by doctor. 
Survey of 
Income and 
Program 
Participation 
~14,000-37000 
households 
Medium (2.5-4 
years) 
Main focus is on federal/state/local income 
transfer programs. 
Panel Study of 
Income 
Dynamics 
~9,000 households Long (1968-
present) 
Began in 1968 with 4,000 families. All 
descendants of the originally surveyed 
families are added to the sample. Detailed 
demographic, human capital, and work 
history information. 
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 
(1979) 
~13,000 individuals Long (1979-
present) 
Respondents were 14-22 in 1979. Detailed 
demographic, human capital, and work 
history information. 
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 
(1997) 
~9,000 individuals Long (1997-
present) 
Respondents were 12-16 in 1997. Detailed 
demographic, human capital, and work 
history information. 
Longitudinal 
Employer 
Household 
Dynamics 
98% of private, non-
farm employment 
Long (1990-
present) 
Linked employer-employee data. Quarterly 
observations of earnings and job status. 
Only basic demographic information is 
available on workers. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Reasons for Announced Job Loss Announcements Over Time 
 
 All 
Years 
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2007 
Reorganization 
 
503 116 127 173 87 
Restructuring 
 
315 37 96 143 39 
Cost Control 
 
619 103 162 222 132 
Slump in Demand 
 
1,855 568 588 365 334 
Increased Competition 
 
99 20 20 45 14 
Merger 
 
130 8 29 49 44 
Restore Profitability 
 
71 16 16 16 23 
Bankruptcy 
 
40 2 8  30 
Leaving Market 
 
134 54 32 27 21 
In-House Merger 
 
11 0 3 4 4 
Posting Losses 
 
259 107 97 41 14 
Plant Closing 
 
303 66 84 71 82 
Increase Earnings 
 
28 5 4 13 6 
Excess Supply 
 
340 148 160 24 8 
Structural 
 
30 13 9 8 0 
Strike 
 
200 134 47 19 0 
Other 
 
305 145 95 45 20 
Missing 111 37 38 32 4 
 
Source: Calculations by the authors using announcement information from the Wall Street Journal and 
data stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
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Table 3. Effects of Layoffs on CEO Pay 
 
 Dependent Variable: Log Total CEO Compensationa 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
(Any Layoff)t-1 
 
0.378*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.134*** 
(0.044) 
-0.050 
(0.036) 
Log(market value of equity) 
 
 
_____ 
0.319*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.534*** 
(0.033) 
(Annual Return)t-1 
 
 
_____ 
0.149*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.070*** 
(0.026) 
Other Regressors 
 
no yes yes 
Company Indicators 
 
no no yes 
R2 
 
0.019 0.252 0.693 
 
aTotal compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other compensation and exercised options. 
bOther regressors are age of the CEO and its square, seniority of the CEO and its square and yearly 
indicators variables. 
***significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 
Sample size is 3,242.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Source: Hallock (1998)
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Table 4. Are Excess Price Reactions to Layoffs Explained by “Reasons” or Time? 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1970-2007 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2007 
Constant 
 
-0.654*** 
(0.132) 
-0.403 
(0.327) 
-0.269 
(0.494) 
-0.046 
(0.562) 
0.683 
(0.721) 
-2.061** 
(1.022) 
1980-1989 
 
0.423** 
(0.186) 
0.311** 
(0.126) 
    
1990-1999 
 
0.664*** 
(0.199) 
0.458*** 
(0.135) 
    
2000 – 2007 
 
-0.109 
(0.235) 
0.083 
(0.174) 
    
Reason 
Indicators 
      
Reorganization 
 
 0.456 
(0.344) 
0.223 
(0.558) 
0.348 
(0.606) 
-0.154 
(0.751) 
2.472** 
(1.105) 
Plant Closing 
 
 0.192 
(0.329) 
0.313 
(0.559) 
0.389 
(0.631) 
-1.182 
(0.848) 
1.664 
(1.127) 
Demand 
Slump 
 -0.206 
(0.342) 
-0.244 
(0.508) 
-0.298 
(0.578) 
-0.881 
(0.746) 
1.440 
(1.057) 
Cost 
 
 -0.004 
(0.342) 
-0.427 
(0.539) 
-0.027 
(0.604) 
-0.536 
(0.756) 
2.009* 
(1.087) 
Other 
 
 0.327 
(0.343) 
0.106 
(0.520) 
0.297 
(0.609) 
-0.165 
(0.783) 
2.181* 
(1.113) 
p-value 
Decade = 0 
0.001 0.004     
p-value 
Reason = 0 
 0.0001 0.095 0.054 0.065 0.131 
R2 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
N 4907 4907 1515 1515 1183 694 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Observations are weighted by the inverse of the standard 
error of the cumulative excess return.  The base category is the 1970-1979 period due to 
“missing” reasons. 
